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DRAFTING, LOBBYING, AND LITIGATING VAWA:
NATIONAL, LOCAL, AND TRANSNATIONAL
INTERVENTIONS ON BEHALF OF WOMEN’S EQUALITY
JUDITH RESNIK*
At the symposium, my commentary was interlaced with references to a
several-page handout, providing excerpts of statutes, reports, and
speeches. In written format, those materials are partially reproduced in
text and otherwise in footnotes; for easier reading, these comments are
set out separately from the transcript.1
ENACTING AND DEBATING VAWA’S CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
I begin with the centerpiece of the conflict about the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994 (VAWA)—the civil rights remedy of VAWA.2 Its words were both
* Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. All rights reserved. © 2010, Judith Resnik.
Thanks are due to the conveners and the Journal for their hospitality, to co-panelists, Martha Davis, Julie
Goldscheid, Mary Schroeder, and Fred Strebeigh, to the speakers on the other panels, to Victoria
Degtyareva, Allison Tait, Marisa B. Van Saaren, and Sarah J. Watson for help in shaping this commentary,
and to Nicole Eisenman for enabling this format, offering some of the many citations to our discussions.
As I explained when I greeted others at the Symposium, I knew as soon as I arrived that thanks were due
to Lynn Hecht Schafran, Legal Momentum, and the Georgetown Journal of Law and Gender for bringing
together so many of the participants to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the enactment of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). But I had not realized until I listened to the discussions and to the
eloquent speech by Vice President Biden just how moved and educated I would be, and hence how deep
my gratitude is. Special recognition is owed to Lynn Hecht Schafran, who directs the National Judicial
Education Program, a title more than apt, for Lynn is, par excellence, a remarkable designer of
educational curricula. Lynn has illuminated the roles that gender, race, and ethnic stereotypes and bias
play in the law, the harms of violence against women, and has identified methods of responses that have
reshaped laws and practices. Hence, Lynn teaches us about the work that brought VAWA into being and
what needs to be done now.
1. I cannot provide comprehensive bibliographical materials but want to offer a few citations to serve
as paths to the extensive literature. See, e.g., Martha Davis, Fighting Gender and Sexual Orientation
Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 387 (2001); Contemporary Challenges to Gender Equality, 43 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 159 (1999). Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 4 J.L. &
POL’Y 391 (1996); Julie Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2007); The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act:
Struck Down But Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157 (2005); The Second Circuit Addresses Gender-Based
Violence: A Review of Violence Against Women Act Cases, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2000); Victoria
Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
951 (2000); Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting For Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063 (1995);
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979 (1993);
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist,
20 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 439 (1993); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Will Inquiry Produce Action? Studying the
Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 615 (1998); FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL:
WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW (2009); Mary Schroeder, Judging with a Difference, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 255 (2002). My commentary draws in part on previously published articles, noted below, that
I have written about VAWA, gender, and the federal courts.
2. VAWA included many provisions, codified in various parts of the United States Code, and
remaining in effect. The provision on which I focus is the subpart, called “Civil Rights Remedies for
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carefully thought out and negotiated, and hence the exact terms are important to know.
Key to what Congress entitled the “Civil Rights” remedy of VAWA is its provision:
“All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender . . . .”3 In addition, Congress specified a right to obtain
supplemental remedies in federal court atop what other provisions might be available
under state law—provided to “all persons” subjected to what VAWA recognized as
violations of liberty, autonomy, and equality.4
Gender-Motivated Violence Act,” codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981, that was held to be beyond
congressional powers in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), discussed infra.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(6).
4. The text of the relevant parts of 42 U.S.C. § 13981 reads:
Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this subtitle under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution, it is the purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of gender
motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of
violence motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d)).
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus
deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party
injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section—
(1) the term ‘crime of violence motivated by gender’ means a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim’s gender; and
(2) the term ‘crime of violence’ [means]—
(A) [means] an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or
that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of
physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal
offenses described in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, whether or not those acts
have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not
those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the
United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and
the individual against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures
(1) Limitation
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c) of
this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the
meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
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As was discussed during the symposium, many different sectors weighed in
on the language of this provision. My focus is on federal judges, who have
three principle ways to provide views. The longstanding and familiar method is
through judgments rendered in specific cases by individual trial level judges, by
panels on appeal, and by the Supreme Court.
Second, the federal judiciary “speaks” through a collective voice when it
makes official policy under the auspices of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. This body was first chartered by Congress in the 1920s at the prompting of
then-Chief Justice William Howard Taft. Today, more than two dozen federal
judges gather from around the country twice annually to consider the “condition
of business in the courts of the United States.”5
A third means by which judicial viewpoints can be made known are the
speeches of the Chief Justice. Since the mid-1980s, the Chief Justice of the
United States has offered an annual “state of the judiciary” speech, thereby
serving as a spokesperson addressing topics of his own choosing.6 While not
official policy, these annual addresses may be interrelated to the positions taken
by the Judicial Conference, which the Chief Justice chairs.
The role taken on by the Judicial Conference has grown over the decades.
Under the leadership of Chief Justices Earl Warren, Warren Burger, and William
Rehnquist, the group became more active in seeking to make its views known to
Congress. The Conference has called upon Congress to support more judgeships,
better salaries, and expansion of courthouse facilities.
On occasion, the Conference has also proposed changes in legislation, such as
its advocacy for the Multi-District Litigation statute and for the creation of
magistrate judgeships. Beginning mid-century, the Judicial Conference began, on
selected occasions, to offer views on the desirability of enacting legislative
(2) No prior criminal action
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction
to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c).
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought
pursuant to this subtitle.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of title 28, United States Code, nor subsection (c) of this section
shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the
courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment
of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
decree. . . .
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 331. Additional discussion of the history of the Conference can be found in Judith
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV.
924 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury].
6. Chief Justice Warren Burger first began what is now a tradition of annual “state of the judiciary”
speeches. See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and
the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1608 (2006).
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proposals to vest authority in the federal courts for new causes of action. When
issuing such views, the Judicial Conference formally votes to make the official
policy for the federal courts.7 All three forms of judicial voices—decisions,
Conference policies, and the Chief Justice’s speeches—were heard in the debate
about the civil rights remedy of VAWA.8
In 1991, the Chief Justice appointed an “Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-
Based Violence” to advise the Judicial Conference on whether it should take a
position on the Violence Against Women Act that then-Senator Biden had
introduced into Congress.9 The Committee reported that it reluctantly recom-
mended opposing VAWA.10 As the excerpt (distributed at the symposium) from
1991 indicates, judges were concerned about VAWA’s potential impact on the
federal courts because, as drafted, the Conference believed the statute could
“significantly threaten the ability of the federal courts to administer” both the new
VAWA provisions and “other Acts of Congress, promptly, fairly, and in
accordance with” those acts’objectives.11 Pursuant to the Committee’s recommen-
dations, the Judicial Conference took the official position that, while “supporting
the objectives” of VAWA, it was opposed to enactment of the civil rights remedy
of VAWA.12
What was the divide between proponents of the civil rights remedy and the
Judicial Conference in 1991? The supporters saw (and continue to see) its
provisions as methods to further the substantive equality of women by enabling
them to be equal participants in all facets of life—from their households to their
workplaces and in between, moving freely in urban areas and in rural settings.
The model was earlier federal provisions against lynching—used to try to make
plain (and to make true) that federal law tolerated no violence based on race.
Creating a cause of action for people treated violently because of their gender that
gave them access to the federal courts was one way to help women be physically
safe when they used public transportation to participate in commercial activities
as they went to schools and universities and when they worked in their homes. I
should add that the need for physical safety as a female worker was more than
apparent to me in the late 1990s, when I worked at night on the VAWA amicus
brief filed on behalf of some one hundred law professors arguing the statute’s
7. See Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury, supra note 5, at 950.
8. This discussion builds on my article, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000), which provides additional
analysis of the roles played by the federal judiciary.
9. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 47 (Sept.
1991) (describing the vote of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference to “recommend the
appointment by the Chief Justice of a special Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence”).
10. See Resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States, in REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 57-58 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter Judicial Conference
VAWA Resolution, 1991] (approving the resolution “after considering the report and recommendation of
the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction and the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence”).
11. Id. at 57.
12. Id.
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constitutionality.13 When leaving my office in New Haven, I worried about my
late night walk to a car—was it safe for me to do so? Workers who must travel at
night are particularly vulnerable to violence, and given that safety is required for
the realization of women’s economic equality, I was all the more clear that VAWA
was appropriately located by Congress under its Article I Commerce Clause
powers as well as its Fourteenth Amendment authority.
In contrast to this vision that violence was linked to economic equality and
civil rights and that federal law could help to inscribe that connection, opponents
of the draft civil rights remedy located the issue of violence as a matter of
local governance over families, domestic relations, and crime, and then ob-
jected to letting those kinds of issues into federal courts. In 1991, the Judicial
Conference joined with the National Conference of Chief Justices of the State
Courts to argue that, if the 1991 version of VAWA were enacted, women
could use such federal lawsuits as a “bargaining tool within the context of
divorce negotiations” that were already “often acrimonious.”14 Moreover, the
Judicial Conference of the United States cited Chief Justice Rehnquist as noting
that more than “three million domestic relations cases were filed in state courts in
1989. If a party to one-tenth of those suits were to seek collateral recourse under
[VAWA], those cases alone would exceed the total of all cases now pending in the
district courts and the courts of appeals of the federal judiciary.”15 While
opposing this aspect of the legislation, the Judicial Conference expressed its
support of the need to protect women from violence and offered to “work with
Congress to ensure the most efficient utilization of scarce judicial resources and to
fashion an appropriate response to violence directed at women.”16
During the same year, 1991, Chief Justice William Rehnquist used his annual
state of the judiciary address to call on Congress to “reexamine the role of the
federal courts,” as he also counseled against increasing too much the number of
judges. He argued that “[m]odest curtailment of federal jurisdiction is important;
equally important is self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action.”17
Chief Justice Rehnquist listed several bodies of extant law that he called
“candidates for possible curtailment,” such as diversity jurisdiction, the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, the Jones Act, and habeas corpus. The Chief Justice
also cited pending legislation as “unnecessarily” expanding federal jurisdiction;
included on that list was VAWA. “Although supporting the underlying objec-
tive . . . to deter violence against women,” he reiterated the objections of the
13. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032805. I joined, as co-counsel, Bruce Ackerman,
Jack M. Balkin, Vicki C. Jackson, and Frank I. Michelman [hereinafter Law Professors VAWAAmicus Brief].
14. Judicial Conference VAWA Resolution, 1991, supra note 10, at 57 (quoting and endorsing
comments made on behalf of the National Conference of State Chief Justices).
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id.
17. See William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted in THE THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 1992, at 2–3.
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Judicial Conference—that because of what he characterized as its too-sweeping
definition of crimes of violence and its creation of a private right of action, the
bill “could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations
disputes.”18
The idea that the Judicial Conference would be opposed to giving access to the
federal courts for suits brought by victims of violence motivated by gender was
troubling to many—inside as well as outside the judiciary. Much discussion
ensued, producing both a revised draft of VAWA’s civil rights remedy and another
request by the Judicial Conference to a reconstituted Ad Hoc Committee on
Gender-Based Violence to take up the question of the statute again.19 In 1993, the
Judicial Conference reported that, based on the new committee report and “as a
result of a dialogue the Ad Hoc Committee has undertaken with the sponsors of
the proposed Violence Against Women Act of 1991,” the Conference had
modified its views.20 It took “no position” on the specific provisions (and hence
on the civil rights remedy) and reiterated “its general concerns about the trend
toward federalization of state law crimes and causes of action.”21 Further, the
Conference affirmatively supported provisions of Title V of VAWA, “encourag-
ing circuit judicial councils to conduct studies with respect to gender bias in their
respective circuits.”22
In 1994, VAWA was enacted. Thereafter, the Chief Justice continued to raise
questions about its validity. In 1998 at a speech to the American Law Institute
(ALI), the Chief Justice mentioned several pieces of enacted legislation that he
thought questionable because of their expansion of federal jurisdiction.23
Included were the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, the Child
Support Recovery Act of 1992, and the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992,
18. Id. at 3.
19. Many of the panelists, including Mary Schroeder and Victoria Nourse, provided discussions of
how the shift came about. See, e.g., Present at the Creation: Drafting and Passing the Violence Against
Women Act (remarks of Victoria Nourse), supra, and The VAWA Civil Rights Provision: Shaping It,
Saving It, Litigating it, Losing It (remarks of Hon. Mary Schroeder), supra.
20. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (March
1993) [hereinafter Judicial Conference VAWA Resolution, 1993].
21. Id.
22. Id. See also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
63-64 (Sept. 1992) (bias in the Federal Judiciary). “Concluding that bias, in all of its forms, presents a
danger to the effective administration of justice in federal courts,” the Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management recommended and the Conference adopted “a resolution
encouraging each circuit not already doing so to sponsor educational programs for judges, supporting
personnel and attorneys to sensitize them to concerns of bias based on race, ethnicity, gender, age, and
disability, and the extent to which bias may affect litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and all who work in the
judicial branch.” Id. at 64. The Conference also voted to “encourage each circuit to report” to its
committee the implementation actions taken on the resolution. Id.
23. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Monday Afternoon Session, in Am. Law Inst., 75th Annual
Meeting: Remarks and Addresses, May 11–14, 1998, at 13, 17-18.
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as well as “recent arson provisions.”24 Not only did “[t]raditional principles of
federalism that have guided this country throughout its existence” render the
statutes of concern, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “one senses from the
context in which [these bills] were enacted that the question of whether the states
are doing an adequate job in this particular area was never seriously asked.”25
As is familiar, in 2000, the Chief Justice wrote the majority decision on behalf
of the five justices who found VAWA’s civil rights remedy to be unconstitu-
tional.26 In that opinion, the Chief Justice relied on the view that the
“Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local,” and concluded that Congress had exceeded its authority under both
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.27
The civil rights remedy was plainly of great symbolic import. A question
exists, however, about its practical utility. Before VAWA’s enactment, the Judicial
Conference had asked its Office of Judicial Impact Assessment to study the
anticipated impact of the legislation. The Office argued that the judicial impact
would be profound and forecast a flood of new filings, with some 13,000 cases
expected each year.28 Moreover, as noted above, the Judicial Conference had
suggested that the 1991 version of VAWA could have produced a caseload larger
than that of the district and appellate courts.29 But when the Supreme Court
decided Morrison, those of us writing the amicus brief on behalf of law
professors found few decisions under VAWA; we reported that we had identified
some fifty opinions citing the civil rights remedy that had been published during
its six-year lifespan.30
ASSESSING THE IMPORT AND THE ROUTES TO CHANGE
What, then, should we make of this brief overview, spanning the last decade of
the twentieth century? Did it matter that the civil rights remedy was won and then
lost? What was lost? What are the lessons to be drawn from these events? Below,
I sketch five insights to be gleaned from these exchanges.
A first focus is on the constitutional import of the ruling. Some of my law
colleagues have argued that the Court’s limits on Commerce Clause powers in
Morrison have been undercut by later decisions, such as Gonzalez v. Raich,31 and
concluded that as a matter of constitutional doctrine, Morrison is not of great
moment. I think them wrong; Morrison stands as a serious obstacle to the federal,
24. Id.
25. Id. at 18.
26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
27. Id. at 617–18. See generally Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) [hereinafter Resnik, Categorical Federalism].
28. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 13 (1991) (quoting an Office of Judicial Impact Assessment estimate).
29. Judicial Conference VAWA Resolution, 1991, supra note 10, at 58.
30. Law Professors VAWAAmicus Brief, supra note 13, at *13.
31. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
2010] 563COMMENTARY: DRAFTING, LOBBYING, AND LITIGATING VAWA
legal acknowledgement of the role that inequality and violence play in social
ordering and to the contributions that the federal courts could make as one source
of remedies. When, as in Morrison, a woman is raped on a college campus, that
event has nothing to do with families and the remedies should not be seen as
exclusively located in state competencies. Violence ought not to be presumed to
be a facet of family life or only of local criminal activity but, given the degree to
which women are the targets, as a structural issue with broad implications.
Moreover, even when violence occurs within families, that category—
family—is not one beyond the reach of federal law or necessarily outside the
authority of the federal judiciary. Elsewhere, I have detailed some of the content
of what I termed the “federal laws of the family,”32 through which federal courts
regularly deal with family-related issues as they interpret statutes, constitutional
mandates, and international agreements. While not often termed “family law,”
bodies of federal statutory regimes—immigration, tax, bankruptcy, pensions—all
require federal judges to apply legal rules to family life. One example is the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which is, in part,
federal marital property law as it governs the allocation of pension assets between
spouses.33 Another example comes from The Hague Convention governing
international custody disputes.34
In addition, the Supreme Court has also identified an important role for
constitutional law to play in superintending state court decisions about marriage
and visitation rights. Famously, in the aptly-named Loving v. Virginia, the Court
held that race could not be used as a criterion for marriage.35 In Troxel v.
Granville, the Court concluded that a state could not, in certain instances, require
that grandparents be given visitation rights.36 Meanwhile, Congress has opined
on same-sex marriage through its enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act,
authorizing states, as a matter of federal Full Faith and Credit law, to decline to
recognize same-sex marriages if permitted in other states.37 To sum up this first
lesson from the VAWA conflicts, Morrison stands as a mis-description of federal
law’s relationship to households, and as a missed opportunity to recognize the
role played by violence in subordination and in the production of economic
inequality.
A second lesson comes from the history of federal judicial efforts before 1993
32. See Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991); see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment,
Sex, Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002).
33. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829; see also
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) (holding that ERISA preempted the application of Louisiana’s
community property laws).
34. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 99
U.S.T. 11 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610).
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
37. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code, including 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
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to dissuade Congress from enacting the civil rights remedy of VAWA. What
transpired is an example of why federal judges ought not to weigh in on proposals
in Congress about whether to create new causes of action or new crimes—
whether opposed or supportive. When the judiciary can be seen as positioned ex
ante, its legitimacy ex post can be questioned. Moreover, as sophisticated
litigants come to understand that the federal judiciary can take positions on
statutes, efforts are made to influence those views. The judiciary becomes a target
of lobbying, as the history of the civil rights remedy in VAWA illustrates.
The judiciary as an entity ought instead to be understood to be agnostic about
what comes before it. Therefore the Judicial Conference ought not exercise its
corporate voice as a spokesperson for Article III judges to propose or to oppose
new rights or new crimes. Similarly, the Chief Justice ought not to target statutes
and raise questions about them in speeches but rather stand apart from
discussions of the merits of particular congressional authorizations that bring
cases to the federal courts. Of course, both the Conference and the Chief Justice
could report that the courts’ workload, in general, outruns its resources. But
neither should identify particular categories of cases as the “wrong kind” for “the
federal courts”; to do so both intrudes on the policy decisions that Congress ought
to make about when to authorize use of the federal courts and suggests that the
judiciary has prepositioned itself in terms of certain kinds of claims or certain
kinds of claimants.
Let me be sure to underscore that the exchange around VAWA’s civil rights
remedy was but one of many instances in which the Judicial Conference had been
active in opposing the entry of certain kinds of rights-seekers into federal court.
Federal judges campaigned against the Child Support Recovery Act from its
inception in the 1940s (when it was nicknamed the “Runaway Pappy Act”38)
through its enactment in 1992.39 Further, as can be seen from the excerpt of the
1995 Long Range Plan of the Judicial Conference of the United States, that
first-ever report included a Recommendation (number 6) that stated: “Congress
should be encouraged to exercise restraint in the enactment of new statutes that
assign civil jurisdiction to the federal courts and should do so only to further
clearly defined and justified federal interests.”40 The Long Range Plan offered a
few examples of what would justify new claims (such as state-failures), but the
Plan’s basic thrust was that Congress should have a presumption against new
rights-creation, if enforced in federal court. While these remarks are not the place
to explore how theories of judging do not envision judges adopting a corporate
38. See H.R. 1538, 81st Cong. (1949); S. 1265, 77th Cong. (1941); see also Resnik, Categorical
Federalism, supra note 27, at 646–53.
39. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 57
(Sept. 1992) (“[e]xpressing opposition to a pronounced trend by Congress of federalizing traditional state
crimes, the Executive Committee agreed on behalf of the Judicial Conference to oppose” four bills,
including the “Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992” and the “Kahla Lansing Child Protection Act”).
40. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 88 (1995).
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identity to advance their world view through legislation,41 my point here is that
the history of VAWA’s civil rights remedy is not unique, for the Judicial
Conference has sought to derail other legislation proposals to send various
litigants (such as those whose computers collapsed as was feared in Y2K or
health care claimants) to the federal courts.
A third lesson to be drawn from Morrison is about federalism. While that
opinion invoked federalism against the civil rights remedy, the fact is federalism
can be used in service of the aims of VAWA. The redundancy and multiple
sources of law-making that are intrinsic to a federated system offer opportunities
to generate many efforts, at the state and local level, to respond to the injuries
identified in VAWA. As the New York City Council put it in 2000, “In light of the
void left by the Supreme Court’s decision, this Council finds that victims of
gender-motivated violence should have a private right of action against their
perpetrators under the Administrative Code.”42 The Council then explained that
its “private right of action aims to resolve the difficulty that victims face in
seeking court remedies by providing an officially sanctioned and legitimate cause
of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from gender-motivated
violence.”43 At the state level, both California and Illinois have also crafted
private actions for damages or other remedies in their state courts for victims of
“gender violence” or “gender-related violence.”44 Like VAWA, the reported case
law on these remedies is sparse, and may well remind us of the criticism made in
advance by some commentators of VAWA’s civil rights remedy—that it was a
limited remedy because it depended on victims with knowledge and resources to
pursue such relief.
41. I discuss these questions in depth in Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury, supra note 5;
and in Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: the Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78
IND. L.J. 223 (2003).
42. Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent, Actions by Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence,
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-902 (2000). Very few reported decisions cite this cause of action. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Cintron, No. 5999/2008, 2009 WL 3199222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2009) (unreported decision on
disqualification of defendant’s counsel); Cordero v. Epstein, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)
(finding City Council’s extension of a statute of limitations for gender-motivated violence preempted by
state legislation).
43. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-902.
44. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 52.4 (West 2004) (“Any person who has been subjected to gender violence
may bring a civil action for damages against any responsible party. The plaintiff may seek actual
damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, any combination of those, or any
other appropriate relief. The prevailing plaintiff may also be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs.”); 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10 (West 2004) (“Any person who has been subjected to gender-related vio-
lence . . . may bring a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or other appropriate relief against a
person or persons perpetrating that gender-related violence. For purposes of this Section, “perpetrating”
means either personally committing the gender-related violence or personally encouraging or assisting
the act or acts of gender-related violence.”). A California court recently concluded that a claim under this
provision did not fall within an arbitration agreement entered into between two companies. See RN
Solution Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). See generally
Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Treatment of VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy,
9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327 (2003).
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A fourth lesson is that Morrison slowed, but did not stop, national efforts to
redress violence against women. In 2003, members of Congress put forth the
Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act, which would have
provided for damage actions in federal court under specified circumstances, such
as if the gender-based violence entailed interstate travel or instrumentalities.45 In
addition, in 2007, Senator Biden again demonstrated his concern about violence
when he proposed the International Violence Against Women Act (IVAWA). That
bill sought “to promote women’s political, economic, educational, social,
cultural, civil, and human rights and opportunities throughout the world” by
systematically integrating and coordinating “efforts to prevent and respond to
violence against women and girls into United States foreign policy and foreign
assistance programs, and to expand implementation of effective practices and
programs.”46 Recall that the majority had used state authority as a basis for
rebuffing VAWA’s civil rights remedy. In contrast, IVAWA relies on federal
authority to relate to the international arena.
Moving to this transnational level, many bodies have recognized the harms of
gender-based violence and expressly linked them to women’s subordination and
lack of equality. For example, a 2000 report issued by the United Nations
Children’s Fund and entitled Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls
concluded that:
Violence against women is present in every country, cutting across
boundaries of culture, class, education, income, ethnicity and age.
Even though most societies proscribe violence against women, the
reality is that violations against women’s human rights are often
sanctioned under the garb of cultural practices and norms, or through
misinterpretation of religious tenets. Moreover, when the violation
takes place within the home, as is very often the case, the abuse is
effectively condoned by the tacit silence and the passivity displayed by
45. The proposal would have provided for damage actions in federal court if:
(A) [I]n connection with the offense—
(i) the defendant or the victim travels in interstate or foreign commerce;
(ii) the defendant or the victim uses a facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce; or
(iii) the defendant employs a firearm, explosive, incendiary device, or other weapon, or a
narcotic or drug listed pursuant to section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act, or other
noxious or dangerous substance, that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce;
(B) the offense interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is
engaged at the time of the conduct; or
(C) the offense was committed with intent to interfere with the victim’s commercial or other
economic activity.
Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 394, 108th Cong. § 2
(2003).
46. See International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
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the state and the law-enforcing machinery.47
A similar recognition of the harm of violence against women comes from the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).48 When first in force in the early 1980s, CEDAW did not speak
directly to violence. In 1992, however, the expert committee that oversees
CEDAW promulgated its General Recommendation No. 19, which calls on state
parties to “take all legal and other measures . . . necessary to provide effective
protection against gender-based violence,” including “penal sanctions, civil
remedies and compensatory provisions” as well as “preventive” and “protective”
measures aimed at education and rehabilitation.49 Likewise, the United Nations
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) also has identified limiting violence
against women as one of the central goals for the decade.50
These multiple efforts bring me to a fifth lesson from the narrative of VAWA’s
civil rights remedy and the federal courts—about the need to operate on multiple
levels at the same time, rather than to box problems as “truly local,” or “truly
national,” or specifically international. Chief Justice William Rehnquist was right
to focus on the localism of violence, for that violence is visited on the locality of a
woman’s body. But it is also a phenomenon shared across all borders. Thus, the
error was in assuming that the localism of violence should be a barrier to a
remedy provided at each and every level.
Hence, I want to put forth a gentle critique of the 2007 draft of the International
Violence Against Women Act, with a new national “Office of Women’s Global
Initiatives.”51 The proposed statute does not specify that such an office ought to
be looking at the local levels as well as focused on interactions at the level of
nation-states. In cities around the world, individuals have done important work
on violence against women—making localities (sadly) more than expert on these
problems. National efforts ought to find means by which to help transmit
knowledge of the better programs and practices, of the challenges of law
enforcement, and of the effects of social structures, from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, crossing borders and bridging the local, the national, and the
international.52 The legislation should structure into its mandates that federal-
level offices draw on such resources as well as serve as a hub to connect programs
47. UNICEF, Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, INNOCENTI DIGEST, June 2000, at 2,
http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf.
48. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
49. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation
No. 19 (11th Session, 1992), ¶ 24(t), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19.
50. See UNIFEM, UNIFEM ANNUAL REPORT 2008–2009 (2009) (Mission and Mandate), available at
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/annual_report_2008_2009_en.pdf.
51. See International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong. § 300B.
52. For additional discussion, see Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
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and legal remedies at different levels of governance to enable trans-local and
trans-national relationships to develop.
The criss-crossing of borders is not a novel suggestion but rather exemplified
by so many who worked on VAWA—Legal Momentum, the National Judicial
Education Project, and the National Association of Women Judges. In the
language of social movements, the concept of “NGOs”—nongovernmental
organizations—is familiar. Legal Momentum is one example. In addition, one
can find many government organizations (GOs) doing policy work. Political
science also identifies “SIGs” or “special interest groups,” and PIGs, “public
interest groups.”
Yet another set of organizations needs to be added to this typography, and
I propose capturing it with the term “translocal organizations of government
actors”—and the acronym TOGAs, reflecting their civic import. These are
“private” groups of “public” actors who come together to share information and
expertise and to influence policy. Illustrative are the National Association of
Women Judges, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Governors Asso-
ciation, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the National
Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts. These private organizations gain
political capital by being comprised of various kinds of government office
holders and they can—as illustrated by the 1994 enactment of VAWA—have
significant effects on lawmaking. We who are interested in reshaping the
remedies for violence against women should turn again to consider the spectrum
of organizations—TOGAs, NGOs, and the like—to enlist them affirmatively in
such work.53
In sum, in this, the fifteenth year after the enactment of the Violence Against
Women Act, we should be acutely aware that we are in media res, in the middle of
the story. Most of the Act is in place, and is an important source of federal support
for anti-violence efforts. I’m grateful and touched to be brought together for a
reunion in honor of our fifteenth year, and I hope for a return invitation. But I
would like not to wait fifteen years, but just five, and at the twentieth anniversary,
I hope we will debate the next piece of legislation and that it, in turn, reflects the
interdependencies between the local, the national and the global—all to be
engaged to respond to the role played by violence in gender inequalities.
53. See Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin, & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level:
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 709 (2008).
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